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NoTEs
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SOME PROBLEMS IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF BAIL
[T]he bail system failed to accomplish either of its pur-
poses, the assurance of the presence of the bailed accused at the
trial or the release from custody of those whose presence could reason-
ably be depended upon. 1
The purpose of this note is to discuss some of the modem ad-
ministrative aspects of bail as they relate to the validity of the pre-
ceding critical observation concerning the faults of the bail system.
Special stress will be placed upon the practical application of the
principles of bail to the problems which arise in its administration,
and emphasis will also be placed upon suggested solutions to these
problems. In approaching this subject matter, one must keep in mind
the conflicting policies inherent in the subject: the desire of society
to have the accused stand trial must be balanced against the desire
that no untried accused be needlessly detained. Many times the
practical availability of bail to an accused will depend upon which
policy the court desires to place its stress. The scope and difficulty in
properly conducting bail procedure is illustrated by the following
comment: 2
Grave abuses as to bail are reported from almost every
part of the land. There is general complaint that admission to bail is
a perfunctory routine, that the amount is fixed capriciously or with
reference to arbitrary schedules with no real consideration of the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, that there is frequent carelessness
as to security, that professional sureties flourish in connection with
the criminal courts and are often permitted to assume an aggregate
of liability which makes their bonds worthless, that forfeitures are not
enforced or are feebly and occasionally enforced, and that on the
whole there is no effective security for appearance in cases where
such security is needed.
These problems of bail procedure can best be discussed, for the pur-
poses of this note, through the following categorization: (1) The right
to bail; (2) The proper amount of bail; and (3) Bail forfeiture. How-
ever, before examining these categories, it will be worthwhile to in-
quire into the historical background of the subject as an aid in the
better understanding of the many facets involved in the proper ad-
ministration of bail.
The delivery or bailment of an accused person into the hands of
his friends while he is awaiting trial is a process which has its founda-
tion deeply embedded in the traditions of English law. In fact, it has
1 1 NAT. CoM. ON LAW OBS. AND ENF., REP. ON PROSECUnON 91 (1931).
22 NAT. COM. ON LAw OBs. AND ENF., REP. OF Cmlm. PRos. 22 (1931).
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been said that the concept of bail is as old as English law itself.3 The
present notions of bail, however, were first codified in 1275 under the
guidance of Edward I in the Statute of Westminster, which listed the
types of offenses which were or were not bailable.4 Until this statute
the sheriff had complete discretionary power in a poorly defined area
such discretion, naturally, led to abuses and laxity in bail procedure.
A summary of the policy behind such early bail administration is found
in the following analysis of early English bail:5
If a man was arrested he was usually replevied... that
is to say, he was set free so soon as some sureties (plegii) undertook
... or became bound for his appearance in court. It was not common
to keep men in prison. This apparent leniency of our law was not
due to any love of an abstract liberty. Imprisonment was costly and
troublesome .... The sheriff did not want to keep prisoners; his in-
clination was to discharge himself of all responsibility by handling
them over to their friends.
By 1689 the processes of bail had become so well established that the
only reference made to it in the English Bill of Rights was that
"excessive baile ought not to be required."0
The present English system of bail has changed little since the
Seventeenth Century. The granting of bail in cases of felonies and
misdemeanors is still a purely discretionary matter with the English
judge because bail is neither granted nor denied as a matter of right
-but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion guided by estab-
lished principles and precedents. 7
The English concept of bail, with some modification,8 has been
incorporated into the U.S. Constitution.9 The Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789 guaranteed to all citizens the right to bail and this guarantee
is now embodied in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.'° Thirty-
five states, by the means of constitutional provisions, and one state
by statute, have altered the common law and provide that all persons
shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses
3 1 STEPHEN, A ISTORY OF TEE CRIMNAL LAW OF ENGLAND 233 (1888).
For a general discussion of bail, see 2 PoLLocK AND MArrLAND, HISTORY OF ENG-
LIsH LAw 589 (2d ed. 1911); 6 AM. JuR. 58; 8 C.J.S. 48.
4 1 STEPHEN, supra note 3 at 234.
5 2 POLLOCK AND MA-TLAND, supra note 3 at 584.6 TASWELL-LANGm AD, ENGLISH CONSTITTONAL HISTORY 505 (10th ed.
1946).7 ORFIELD, Cmxirmr.L PROCEDuE FROM AmRsT To APE. 103, 104, 107
(1927); 41 YALE L.J. 293, 294 (1931).8 There is some dispute as to whether or not the Eighth Amendment of the
FEDERAL CONSTI=TTON allows bail as a matter of right. See, OnRm=D, supra note
7 at 111. But of. Carlson v. Landon, 72 S. Ct. 525, 536 (1952); 27 ST. JoHN'S
L.R. 56, 59 (1952).
9 U.S. CONST. Amend. VIII.10 FED. B. Cmm. P. 46 (a) (1).
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where the proof is evident or the presumption great.11 As the pre-
ceding indicates, there is now little confusion or doubt concerning the
law of bail, so far as statement is concerned, but, as the remainder of
this note will disclose, there is neither consistency nor certainty, even
within a jurisdiction, in the administration of this important element
of criminal procedure.
The Right to Bail
The guarantee of bail as a matter of right in non-capital offenses
by the majority of jurisdictions' 2 in this country has been listed as one
of the major causes for defective bail administration in criminal cases.' 3
In most cases there can be no doubt that it is undesirable that an
accused person should be held in custody while awaiting trial.
However, the concept of bail, as a matter of right, has caused its ad-
ministration to be so inflexible that bail often fails in one of its pur-
poses, i.e., securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial.
The absolute right to bail has resulted in hindering the courts in using
their sound judicial discretion in denying bail in those cases where
it seems likely from the individual's record that he will "jump bail".
Further, is often dangerous to allow certain individuals free move-
ment in society, as in the case of sex psychopaths. The notion of bail
as a matter of right has forced courts to free an accused on presentment
of the proper 'security: where he had previously absconded while on
bail and it was likely that he would abscond again;' 4 where the person
was accused of an offense committed while on bail previously
granted;'0 and where the accused was a sex offender and was classi-
fied as a sex psychopath.'" The foregoing instances tend to indicate the
consequences of a policy which makes bail a matter of right. Bail,
under this concept ,is given as readily to the hardened criminal with
a long record of offenses as to the first offender with strong family
and community ties.
The English practice of allowing a great amount of discretion in
the admission of an accused to bail is gaining considerable support
11 ORFIELD, supra note 7 at 107. Only five states have retained the common
law. Four states except only murder from the constitutional guarantee. Three
states provide that bail is a matter of right only for misdemeanors.
12 Ibid.
1 3 BEELEY, Tsn BAI SYsTEmi n CHiCAGO 166 (1927); 41 YAL. L.J. 293, 294(1931).
14 Rowan v. Randolph, 268 Fed. 527 (1920); Kendrick v. State, 180 Ark.
1160,24 S.W. 2d 859 (1930).15 41 YALE L.J. 293, 294, n. 8 (1931).
16 Ex Parte Keddy, 105 Calif. App. 215, 233 P. 2d 159 (1951); 30 CMcAGo-
KENT L.R. 160 (1952); 6 NImxam L.Q. 507 (1952). But cf. People v. Strautz, 583,
4 N.W. 2d 18 (1942).
KENTUcKY LAw JouNAL
within this country.17 This trend is manifested by one authority who
would suspend the bail privilege in cases where: (1) a hardened
offender is charged with a felony; (2) the accused is mentally de-
fective or (3) the convicted person is making an appeal.'8 The
American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure0 advocates
judicial discretion in granting bail if the indictment involved the
commission of murder, treason, arson, robbery, burglary, rape, kid-
napping or any other offense against the person likely to result in
death and be called murder. It is evident that these authorities be-
lieve it necessary to the proper administration of bail that the court
be allowed some discretion in permitting release on bail where a
dangerous felony is involved or a danger to the public would be con-
stituted by the accused's release. Such a position seems reasonable in
light of the fact that such persons are often hardened felons and are
likely to fail to appear at the time of trial.
The foregoing innovations in the law of American bail face two
possible objections: (1) the constitutions of many jurisdictions guar-
antee the right to bail;20 and (2) placing such discretion in the bands
of a court would make it possible for the court to be arbitrary and
abusive of an accused's rights before trial. Naturally, the constitutional
objection is a formidable one because constitutional amendments are
always difficult to accomplish. Nevertheless, it is urged that such
amendments should be a subject for future consideration if bail ad-
ministration is to be made more efficient. The contention that such
discretion in granting bail would place an arbitrary power in the
hands of the court is weakened by the fact that the preceding
authorities urge only partial discretion guided by certain standards.21
This is, in reality, a much more conservative view than the English
practice of complete discretion in allowing bail. This compromise ap-
proach embodies many of the advantages of the English system while,
at the same time, it avoids the valid objections that such discretion
could be abused.
As just stated, discretion in granting bail is greatly limited by
constitutional provisions for those cases less than capital, but judicial
option in the admission of an accused to bail is still of consequence in
those instances involving capital offenses. The usual constitutional
rule is that bail shall be allowed, even in capital offenses, except where
17BEELEY, BAIL Sys=/ IN CHIcAGo 165 (1927); A.L.I. sec. 70 (1930); 41
YALE L.J. 293 (1931).1 8 BELEY, BAL. SYSTEM IN CICAGO 166 (1922).
19 A.L.I. CODE: OF CPnM. P. sec. 70.
20 Supra note 7.
21 Supra notes 18 and 19.
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the proof is evident or the presumption is great.22 The administration
of this rule of law, however, is subject to a wide range of judicial
interpretation by those who determine whether bail is to be allowed in
particular cases. Two distinct views in applying this constitutional
test as to the burden of proof for the allowance of bail in capital cases
are evident from an analysis of cases in several jurisdictions. These
views, all essentially dealing with the burden of proof of guilt for the
purposes of determining if bail is possible, are: (1) The court may
place the burden on the applicant for bail to show that the proof of
criminal responsibility is not evident nor the presumption great;23
(2) The court may place the burden on the prosecution to show that
the proof is evident or the presumption is great.24
The jurisdictions differ as to the weight to be given to the indict-
ment in weighing the evidence of guilt in order to determine if the
admission to bail is proper. One view would allow the indictment to
be conclusive proof that guilt is evident;25 a second view would create
a rebuttable presumption of guilt from the mere existence of the in-
dictment.2 6 Still another approach, which is the rule in Kentucky, 27
would give no weight to the indictment in determining evidence of
guilt for the purpose of granting bail. The divergence of the preceding
rules of interpretation concerning the admission to bail in capital
offenses tends to show the true scope of judicial discretion in this
area of bail administration. It can be seen that the courts are free to
adopt the policy which they believe will most likely serve the purpose
of bail procedure in their jurisdiction.
Amount of Bail
The universally recognized purpose of requiring bail after arrest
is to secure the presence of the accused whenever it shall be lawfully
required, without his continued incarceration. 28 It is obvious that if
this purpose is to be effectuated, it must be accomplished through the
proper determination by the court of a reasonable amount of bail
under the circumstances. The only absolute guide* which is used to
22 Ky. CONST. Sec. 16; Supra note 7, at 108.
23 Ex parte Paige, 82 Cal. App. 576, 255 P. 887 (1921); Ex parte Andrews,
39 Okla. Cr. Rep. 859, 265 P. 144 (1928); Ex parte Decker, 37 Okla. Cr. Rep.
105, 257 P. 332 (1927).
-4 Ex parte Donohue, 112 Tex. Cr. App. 124, 14 S.W. 2d 848 (1929).25 State v. Kuchler, 129 Aft. 632 (N.J. 1929); State v. Diehl, 115 Ohio St.
454, 154 N.E. 726 (1926).20 Deaver v. State, 135 So. 604 (Ala. 1931); State v. Hodges, 177 Ind. 589,
98 N.E. 417 (1912).
27 Commonwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky. 388, 35 S.W. 2d 563 (1931).
2 8 Supra note 11; 6 Am. Jum. 61.
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determine whether a reasonable bail sum has been set by the court
is the constitutional test that the bail must not be excessive.29 The
accepted standard for excessiveness is that bail may be no greater in
amount than is needed to secure the presence of the defendant at the
trial,30 giving consideration to the gravity of the offense.
The foregoing discussion of the standard used to fix bail indicates
that the trial court has a wide discretion in setting the amount of bail
in each case.31 This discretion in determining the amount of bail is a
factor which a court can use to counteract the undesirable results in
administering bail caused by the lack of judicial discretion in refusing
bail in certain instances. In fact, many authorities believe that effective
administration of bail must depend upon the wise exercise of judicial
discretion in fixing the amount of bail.32 Unfortunately, bail is often
administered in routine fashion with no particular regard to the cir-
cumstances of the case; nor is careful thought given to what a reason-
able and proper amount of bail would be.33 The bail system derives
most of its flexibility from the wide discretion which is allowed in
fixing bail; but, if the judge fails to take advantage of this allowable
flexibility the administration of bail is thereby greatly weakened.
Effective exercise of this important discretion in determining the
amount of bail presupposes the consideration and evaluation of several
elements which are inherent in each application for bail, i.e., the
nature of the offense, the penalty involved upon conviction, the
pecuniary and social position of the accused, the general reputation
and character of the defendant, the applicant's previous criminal
record and the weight of the evidence held by the prosecution.34
Each of these factors, if carefully evaluated, is an indicium of the
probability that the accused may or may not abscond. A study of
these factors, by the court, will give it the insight necessary to fix
bail in a reasonable amount which can be met by those not likely to
"jump bond" but which can not be met by those with a "tendency"
to leave the jurisdiction.
In glibly advocating the above standard as criteria for fixing bail
29 U.S. CONST. Amend. VIII; Ky. CoNsT. See. 17.
30 People ex. rel. Sammons v. Snow, 34 Ill. 464, 173 N.E. 8 (1930); FED. R.
Caiu. P. 46 (a)(1).31Ex parte Malley, 50 Nev. 248, 256 P. 512 (1927); Ex parte Spoon,, 18
Okla. Cr. 703, 192 P. 698 (1920); 41 YALE L.J. 293, 296 (1931).3 2 BEELEY, BAiL SYSTEM IN CMCAGO 155 (1927); 41 YALE L.J. 293 (1931).
33 Supra note 7; 41 YALE L.J. 293, 294 (1931).
34 People v. Searles, 229 App. Div. 603, 243 N.Y.S. 15 (1930); BEELEY, BA n
SYSTEM in CmcAGo 155 (1927); FED. R. CRM. P. 46(c); 27 ST. JoHN's L.R. 56,
64 (1952); 41 YALE 293, 297 (1931). One element the court may not use in
setting the amount is the fact that the accused has used the Fifth Amendment.
Noto v. U.S., 76 S. Ct. 255 (1955).
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amounts, the writer realizes the difficulties in administering such
tests and the time which would be involved in the effective investiga-
tion of each element. As has been suggested:
m * ' in more pioneer and rural days, the court or court's
advisors were sufficiently acquainted with the few persons brought
into court to know, with a fair degree of accuracy, whether they
would be dependable or whether they need be detained or put on
bail. . . this personal knowledge is no longer possible.35
Because these rural conditions no longer exist, special administrative
machinery is needed for the sole purpose of determining an accused's
background for the object of fixing an amount of bail.36 Unfor-
tunately, no such machinery is readily available for the use of present
courts, hence they are not able to use the preceding criteria for setting
the amount of bail with maximum effect. Until such administrative
machinery can be established, the courts can greatly increase the
efficiency of bail administration by adhering as closely to these stand-
ards as the present composition of courts will allow.37
Forfeiture
The basic concept of bail is founded upon the proposition that one
of the greatest deterrents to "jumping bail" is the knowledge that the
security pledged to insure the accused's appearance will be forfeited
upon such action.38 Yet, in many jurisdictions the processes of for-
feiture of bail are no longer effective means in assuring the court
that the accused will be present at the appointed time.39 Several
factors can be listed in this apparent breakdown in the administration
of bail forfeiture.
First. A factor which bears a direct relation to the number of
absconders is the carelessness of the courts in the type and value of
security allowed for bail.4 0 The usual types of security are: deposits
of cash; pledges of specified property; mere promises of financially
responsible sureties that a sum will be paid in case of the accused's
non-appearance; and personal recognizances by the accused. 41 Clearly,
the more valuable and secure bond will be the one less likely to be
35 Supra note 1.
36 Id. at 92.
37 It would be of no value to the purpose of this paper to discuss bail in
terms of specific amounts. For a list of cases involving instances of sum certain,
See 8 C.J.S. 109, n. 69.
38 Supra note 7 at 120.
39 WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES oF JuDICrL ADuMNISTRATION 561, 562 (1929);
15 A.B.A.J. 71, 73 (1929); 102 PENN. L.R. 1081, 1067 (1954).40 15 A.B.A.J. 71, 73 (1929).
41 Supra note 7 at 118.
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forfeited, and an actual deposit of cash would perfectly fit this standard
but the possibility of raising cash may be so limited that a reliable
accused could not, under this standard, obtain bail. Perhaps the most
desirable of the securities is a pledge of specified property since such
a pledge would more readily allow an accused his freedom while still
furnishing an incentive to appear at his trial.
Second. The next factor which causes difficulty in the administra-
tion of bail is the court's carelessness in determining the adequacy of
the property which is offered as security for the admission of an
accused to bail.42 Often the surety, a professional bondsman, is al-
lowed to assume an aggregate of liability far beyond the value of the
pledged property which could well render the bail bond worthless. 43
One instance of worthless security is cited where a bondsman was ac-
cepted for $100,000 worth of bonds when his security was a one-half
interest in property valued a $25,000 but covered by a $11,500 mort-
gage.44 It is evident that where the security is extremely inadequate
(as above), the bondsman will feel little fear of ultimate forfeiture
and will give no aid to the court in its effort to find the accused. Such
laxity on the part of the court in scrutinizing the financial ability of
the surety can only achieve the ultimate defeat of the purpose of bail
administration.
Third. One of the most important factors in the high rate of bail
forfeiture is due to the existence of the professional bondsman. His-
torically a bailed person was placed in the hands of his friends or
relatives.45 There was little likelihood that an accused would abscond
when such persons were the sureties and would suffer loss if he failed
to appear at the proper time. However, there is no such reason for
the defendant to properly appear when professional bondsman is
acting as surety. The accused has little reason to care about the pos-
sible loss of the professional surety, especially since the bail fee was
probably exorbitant in the opinion of the accused. Hence, it is seen
that the use of the professional surety gives the accused no real in-
centive to return for trial.46
Fourth. The most important element in the defective administra-
tion of forfeited bail is the carelessness shown by the courts in the
42 Id. at 119; W.mm' Am CABOT, JunGEs Am LAw REFOnmS 27 (1936);
15 A.B.A.J. 71, 73 (1929).
43 102 PENN. L.R. 1031, 1063 (1954).
44 11 J. Cpnm. LAw AND CBIMIINOLOGY 386 (1920).
45 2 POLLOCK AN MAxnrLMW, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LA w 584 (2d ed. 1905).
This is still the practice in England.4 6 For a discussion of the bondsman, see, 102 PENN. L.R. 1031, 1046, 1063
(1954).
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enforcement of forfeited bonds.47 Many courts are extremely lax in
the prosecution of forfeited bonds with the natural result that the
individual surety makes no effort to aid the court in securing the
presence of the accused. Several instances of this gross neglect in
collection procedure are evidenced by the practice of courts in widely
spread jurisdictions. A survey made in one Georgia county for a
period of one year related the fact that only $5,929 was ultimately
collected out of a total of $101,750 of forfeited bail bonds.48 In the
city of Atlanta, for the same period, only $15,462 was actually ob-
tained from a sum of $100,100 of forfeited bonds.49 Even worse ex-
amples can be found in other parts of the nation. Chicago for instance,
had a $5,000 collection from a total of $1,000,000 bail bonds,50 and a
Cleveland survey indicated that only 2% of the forfeited bonds were
collected in that city.-" In 1950 only 20% of forfeitures were collected
in Philadelphia92-a higher rate of collection than the previous ex-
amples, but clearly inadequate to serve the purposes of the bail
system. These statistics indicate that courts, in the past and present,
have completely failed in their duty to make effective the collection
of bail. There is some indication that a few courts are awakening to
their responsibility in collection matters,53 but it is believed that until
many more courts assume their duty in enforcing bail forfeiture, the
administration of bail can never be effective.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis of bail administration and its defects in-
dicates the difficulties which face a conscientious court in properly
administering bail. An effective bail system which accomplishes its
purposes, i.e., the release of an untried accused with the assurance
that he will be present at the trial, is not likely to exist until many of
the defects in bail administration are corrected. Many administrative
deficiencies regarding bail can be corrected by the following suggested
reforms:
(1) "Bail jumping" should be made a separate crime.5 4
47 Supra note 7 at 119; WRNim .Am CABoT, JuncEs AND LA RE ro 27
(1936).
48 16 J. Cnpd. L. AND CRnUMNOLOGY, TABLE 42 (1925-26).
40 Ibid.
50 WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ADMINIsTRATION, 561, 562 (1929).
51 Ibid.
52102 PENN. L.R. 1031, 1061 (1954).
53 Ibid. Detroit had a record collection of 100% of forfeited bonds.54 MINN. STAT. ANN. see. 613.36 (1947); N.Y. PENAL CoDE see. 1694 (a)
(1948).
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(2) The judge should be made criminally liable in cases of gross
negligence in determining the adequacy of security.55
(3) Since it is evident that the security for bail is often extremely
inadequate, an initial, separate deposit, which would be available if
the security failed to satisfy all claims against it, should be required
of the professional bondsman when he applies for a license.50
(4) All forfeited bonds should be carefully collected. 7
(5) A lien should be placed on the property which is pledged for
security.58
(6) Amounts of bail should be less when given by a friend or
relative than if offered by a professional bondsman.
These suggested reforms are not intended to be all-inclusive but
adoption of them would greatly aid the proper administration of bail.
Until such reforms as these are adopted, the bail system as a process
of the criminal courts will continue to be inadequate.
LuT=i HOUSE
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-LEGITIMACY SAVING STATUTES-
CHILDREN OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGES
The question arises whether the children of an attempted common
law marriage,1 which is void in Kentucky, have been made legitimate
by the statutes. This question, uncomplicated by other issues, has
never been decided in Kentucky since the abolition of common law
marriages in 1852.2
Three statutes are applicable. First, Section 391.100 of the Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes seemingly legitimates the issue of common law
marriages, together with most other void marriages, by the following
language:
55 Supra note 7 at 119; A.L.I. CODE OF Cmr. P. sec. 112 (1930). This
would also be analogous to the liability of the common law. See, 2 POLLOC, AN
MATLAND, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 584 (2d Ed. 1905).56 102 PENN. L.R. 1031, 1063 (1954).
57 See U.S. v. Field, 190 F. 2d 554 (1951), where the court jailed a surety
for refusing to give aid to the court in obtaining custody of an accused who had
absconded.
58 Supra note 56.
1 As used in this note, a common law marriage is defined as a marriage based
upon mutual consent of the parties to become husband and wife, per verba de
presenti, then and there, without any formal ceremony. An attempted common
law marriage refers to a factual situation which would raise a valid common law
marriage in a state recognizing common law marriage.2 Ky. Acts 1850, c. 617, p. 212, sees. 2 and 8, effective July 1, 1852.
